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TAXATION: A TRUST AS A FAMILY PARTNER
Despite the income-splitting provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1948,1 the problem of family partnerships still exists.
As a result of the 1948 Act, partnerships between husband
and wife became of little consequence as a method of avoid-
ing high brackets. However, that objective has not dis-
appeared with respect to partnerships between members
of a family other than spouses.
In the Revenue Act of 1913, as in all subsequent acts,
Congress provided that persons carrying on business in
"partnership" were to be liable to taxation only on their
distributive shares of the profits of the business. Congress
did not, however, define the word "partnership." Was it
intended that the question as to the existence of a tax part-
nership was to be determined by local law?
With respect to the Revenue Acts prior to 1932, it was
settled by the Supreme Court that local law was not con-
trolling.2 The controlling law was that which would give
a uniform interpretation of the tax statutes throughout
the states.3 The Revenue Act of 1932, however, contained
a definition of "partnership" and "partner." Since that
Act, the Regulations have included a statement to the effect
that local law is not controlling in determining what is a
partnership; and a statement that the term "partnership"
as used in the statute-is "broader in its scope" than the com-
mon law meaning of the term. While the former statement
repeats what was already the law, the latter changes that
law' by extending the scope of the word and adding that it
"includes groups not commonly called partnerships." Thus,
the statute itself is the measure to be used in determining
what is a partnership.5
It is apparent from the statute that a "partnership" exists
where: (1) a business, financial operation, or venture; (2)
Ist. Rev. Code I 12(d).
• Burk-Waggoner Oil Aza'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110 (1925).
S Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 102, 110 (1932).
'Wild v. Comm'r, 62 Fd 777, 780 (2d Cr. 1933); cf. Comm'r V. N. B.
Whitcomb, 95 F. 2d 596 (6th Cir. 1938).
5 Paul, Partnerhip8 in Tax Avodaince, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 121
(1945).
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is carried on; (3) by a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture,
or other unincorporated organization, which is not a trust,
estate or corporation within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. The statute, after defining the word part-
nership provides "and the term 'partner' includes a member
il. such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organiza-
tion." Based on the meaning of the latter words it would
seem that a "member" would be a person who has become
"associated" by agreeing with others to operate the activity.
The statute makes no express distinction between com-
petent and incompetent members. As stated above, since
the Revenue Act of 1948, the question of a wife's capacity
to be a partner is no longer significant. And with respect
to persons non compos mentis the question is of minor im-
portance.6 However, the question becomes pertinent in the
discussion of family partnerships because in many of them
one or more of the associates is a minor.
Since the partners are "associated" by "agreements," it
Is a reasonable assumption that the statute includes all per-
sons capable, under the general law, of entering into agree-
ments. In view of the general rule that a minor's contracts
are valid until disaffirmed, it would seem that uniformity
would best be obtained by adoption of the rule that minors
are competent to become partners. No case has refused to
recognize minors as partners, solely because of their age.7
Assuming that a minor may be a partner, what require-
ments must be fulfilled before the minor acquires the status
of a bona fide partner? It had been indicated under the
Revenue Acts prior to the lievenue Act of 19328 and was
announced thereafter,9 that a person could not be a partner
unless he contributed either capital or services to the part-
nership. But the last word on family partnerships was
spoken, as to a father and son partnership, in the Culbertson
case.10
In the Culbertson case, the question was whether income
from a cattle business should be taxed to a father and sons
6 See Julius Goldenberg, 5 B.T.A. 213 (1926).
7 01. S. J. Lidov, 16 B.T.A. 1421 (1929).
8 B. M. Phelps, 13 B.T.A 1248 (1928).
' Clarence L. Fox, 5 T.C. 242 (1945); C. Thorrez, 5 T.C. 60 (1945).
10 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
as partners or to the father alone. The Supreme Court
held that neither the Tax Court nor the Court of Appeals
had used proper methods in deciding that issue. It explain-
ed how the tests set out in the Tower caseu should be ap-
plied and remanded the case to the Tax Court to find the
true intent of the parties.
The significance of the Culbertson decision lies in the de-
emphasis of the tests of "original" capital and "vital" serv-
ices in deciding the tax consequences of a family partner-
ship. Chief Justice Vinson, soeaking for the Court, asserted
that the true test of a valid partnership for tax purposes
is intent-whether the "parties in good faith and acting
with a business purpose intended to join together in the
present conduct of the enterprise." 12
Parent-child partnerships often raise a two-sided ques-
tion with tax and other overtones. On the one hand,. if the
ebildren are minors, how may their interests be properly
protected and, on the other hand, how may they assume the
role of real partners that will secure the tax division sought?
One possible answer would appear to be to set up a trust
for the children and make the trust a partner in the parent's
business.
Whether a trust may be a partner for purposes of the
Federal Income Tax would seem to depend upon a number
of factors.
First, is the existence of a valid partnership to be de-
termined by State law or Federal law? The courts have
held that State law will be applied in determining rights
or interests but Federal law controls the manner in
which these rights or interests are to be taxed. In
some cases, however, even though rights or interests have
become fixed tinder State law, the Federal statute may be
applied so as to override the effect of the State law, insofar
n Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946). In Tower and Ltst-
haus (327 U. S. 293 (1946), it was stated that whether or not a valid
partnership for tax purposes was formed depended on the intent of the
parties, and that where the wife's capital came from a gift from her
husband, and she did not perform vital services, nor participate in
management, there was sufficient evidence to uphold the Tax Court's
fnding that no partnership was intended.
n' 887 U.S. at 74L
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as taxation is concerned.1 3 Thus, if under the State law
a valid partnership is found, it may be disregarded for
Federal tax purposes unless there is clearly intended to be a
bona fide business partnership. 14 So it may be pertinent to
inquire whether there can be a bona fide business partner-
ship when a trust is involved.
Generally, if a husband makes a gift of an interest in his
business to his wife or child through the medium of a trust,
no original capital is considered to have been invested by
these donees.15 Also the trust's share of the income may be
taxable to the grantoi under the rule of Helvering V. Clif-
fords because of retention by the grantor of dominion and
control of the trust corpus or income.17  Then, contribu-
tions by the trusts to the partnership are considered contri-
butions by the trusts' grantors. 8 In some cases, however,
the courts have refused to apply the Clifford rule.19 Also,
trusts have been recognized on the basis of separate capital
contributed by beneficiaries ;20 and juries have recognized
children's trusts as valid partners even though the capital
they contributed came to them as gifts from the father. 21
If under the applicable State law, no valid partnership
can be found it would seem that the entity would not be
treated as a partnership for tax purposes unless the ar-
See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
1, Commissioner v. Culbertson, supra note 10.
Zander v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1949); Jerry Majatico,
12 T.C. 146 (1949); Kohl v. Comm'r, 170 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948).
26 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
17 Stanback v. Robertson, 183 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1950); Eisenberg v.
Comm'r, 161 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1947); S. K. Alexander, 6 T.C. 804 (1946);
Hash v. Comm'r, 152 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1945).
Is Comm'r v. Culbertson, supra note 10; Herman Schaeffer v. Comm'r,
174 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1949) , Armstrong v. Comm'r, 143 F.2d 700 (10th
Cir. 1944).
19 Thomas v. Feldman, 158 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1946); Goerlich, P-H
1947 TC Mem. Dec. § 47,012. In the Cumbertson case, the Supreme Court
said: "If the donee of property who then invests it in the family part-
nership exercises dominion and control over that property-and through
that control influences the conduct of the partnership and the disposi-
tion of its income-he may very well be a true partner."
2 Florence R. Miller, P-H 1949 TC Mem. Dec. § 49,001; Goerlich, P-H
1947 TC Mem. Dec. § 47,012.
1 Thompson v. Riggs, 175 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1949); Gerrard v. Camp-
bell, 81 P. Supp. 752 (N. D. Ill. 1949).
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rangement amounts to a joint enterprise or some sort of
organization which is taxed as a partnership.2 If under
State law the trust has no legal right to withdraw partner-
ship income, then all income would be taxed to the person
legally entitled to it and the income paid to the trust would
be treated as a gift.
Since the status of the partnership with a trust will be
extremely doubtful for tax purposes unless such a partner-
ship is clearly valid under State law, the rules of partner-
ship law that will probably be applied in the State courts
must be considered. For one thing, no partnership would
seem to exist unless a clear authorization therefor is con-
tained in the trust instrument. Otherwise the intent of the
settlor would seem to be contravened, for he apparently
meant for the trustee to own and manage the property, not
for it to be held in co-ownership and to be subject to the
liabilities incurred for the partnership by the other part-
ners.
If there is an explicit authorization to enter the partner-
ship, the grantor's assumed intent will be superseded by his
express intent; but another provision of the trust would
probably still have to be consulted in order to determine the
partnership's validity. If there is an immunities provision
in the trust, shielding beneficiaries and trustees alike from
all personal liability--and such provisions are the rule
rather than the exception-the partnership with the trust
becomes a "partnership" with an aggregate of capital rather
than with a person. This is not a limited partnership; yet
it obtains the same results as a limited partnership, without
statutory authorization. Accordingly, the "partnership"
with the trust would seem to be unentitled to recognition as
any type of partnership. If, however, the trustee is to be
personally liable, there would seem to be no conflict with
any strong State public policy in recognizing the partner-
ship.
Judicial Rulings
The various cases from which a practitioner can draw
do not seem to indicate what recognition tax-wise will be
accorded to partnerships with trusts. In an early Board
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of Tax Appeals case,23 it was held that in the absence of
any evidence of bad faith, a partnership agreement may
include a trustee as one of the partners, and income alloca-
ble to the trust will not be taxable to the settlor-partners.
In Thomas v. Feldman,2 4 where taxpayers.transferred to
a trust created by them for the benefit of their children
certain shares of stock in two family corporations, dissolved
the corporations, and had the assets thereof distributed to
the respective shareholders, who organized two limited part-
nerships, with one of the taxpayers as general and manag-
ing partner, the trust and other partners being limited
partners, partnership income allocated to the trust was held
not taxable to the taxpayers.
In a 1949 case,25 there is the statement that whether
. trusts were bona fide members of a partnership must
be determined by their agreement considered as a whole
and their conduct in execution of its provisions." It was
held that there was substantial evidence to sustain the ver-
dict that the trusts were bona fide members of a partnership
organized for business purposes.
A decision by a Federal District Court of Iowa last sum-
mer has provided an interesting addition to the picture. In
Hanson v. Birmingham,26 a father sued for a refund of taxes
assessed against him on income that had been received by
a trust for his children. The trust, rather than the trustee
or the beneficiaries, had been made a partner in his busi-
ness. It was held that the trust was not a bona fide partner
under Iowa partnership law, notwithstanding authorization
in the trust instrument. The Court said that a trust was
not qualified to assume partnership status; therefore, it was
not entitled to recognition as a partner for income tax pur-
poses.
Judge Graven exhaustively reviewed the authorities
from both the common law and the tax standpoint. Con-
siderable reliance was placed upon the fact that none of the
2 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Barnes, 30 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1929).
Reeb, 8 B.T.A. 759 (1927).
" 158 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1946).
" Thompson v. Riggs, supra note 21.
n 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa, 1950).
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leading trust authorities mention the possibility of a trust
being a member of a partnership. "The reason for such
paucity of authority on the question could be that it was
generally assumed that it would be incompatible and incon-
sistent with and alien to common law concepts for a trust
to be a partner."'
On the applicability or inapplicability of State law in
partnership cases under the Federal Income Tax, the Court
stated that there has been no clearcut ruling by the Supreme
Court on the question of whether a partnership, invalid
under State law would be upheld for purposes of the in-
come tax. However, after a comprehensive examination
of the tax cases, Judge Graven concluded that: "There is
no indication in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court that it intended that a type of partnership relation
unknown to any field of the common law should be given
recognition for Federal Income Tax purposes."
Of more substantial import for the taxpayers are the
ideas of the Tax Court. On the point under discussion, a
late decision squarely rejects Judge Graven's holding that
a trust cannot as a matter of law be a member of a partner-
ship.
In (Matter of) Sterzi the Tax Court held that a trust
was a valid partner in a family business, preliminarily
deciding that nothing in substantive law prevents a trust
from being a partner in a business. It specifically rejected
the Hanson case, and further said that IRC 1 3797 (a) (2),
serves to validate a partnership for tax purposes even
though it may be illegal under local law. Five Tax Court
judges dissented from the result. Whether this dissent was
on the common law ground that a trust, cannot be a partner
at all, or on the tax ground that the trusts were not partners
for tax purposes, does not appear.
It is not clear from the cases whether the Commissioner
is going to pursue the Hanson argument and result in order
to knock out trusts as partners in family businesses. Re-
gardless of how the Commissioner will attack the problem
Z& at 45.
15 T.C. No. 71.
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and regardless of the basic legality or illegality of a trust
as a partner, the taxpayer will encounter considerable dif-
ficulty in establishing that his trust is not an obvious tax
avoidance scheme.
Conclusions
In order for a partnership with a trust to function effect-
ively tax wise it would -seem that the tax payer who seeks
to sustain the partnership would have to establish (1) that
under local law there is a valid partnership or some sim-
ilar arrangement by which the trust is legally entitled to a
share of the partnership profits, and (2) that the partner-
ship was formed for a bona fide business purpose and not
merely to avoid taxes.
The difficulty in establishing these points may well dis-
suade tax payers from undertaking such arrangements, at
least until their status is more clearly defined. On the other
hand, these arrangements seem little more subject to ques-
tion than some other income-splitting devices, such as the
transfer of capital or propeity and its lease or loan back to
the grantor.29 Perhaps the only clear way out is the use of
the family corporation; but with that device the incurring
of corporation taxes reduces the gratification of the evasive
tax payer.
ROBERT L. PAGE.
- See Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1529 (1950).

